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Some Practical Problems 
Carol Taylor Torsello 
What is presented bere is to be considered work in progress, but I believe 
that even at its present stage it will also be considered rather daring. It is work 
in progress because the ideas are still taking shape and the implications are still 
being sorted out. It is daring because one aspect of systemic theory is questioned 
on the basis of some problems that arise in application. Halliday once described 
his own approach to language as asking the question "What should we make 
language look like in order to throw light on questions of this kind ?" (Chatman 
1971: 408). This is a very practical, application-oriented approach, and gives me 
the courage to adopt a similar approach myself in this paper. Here I will, in fact, 
be arguing that treating the 'logical' part of semantics as a subdivision of the 
ideational metafunction fails to throw sufficient light on a series of questions 
which arise when Systemics is applied to English language teaching, for 
describing the system, for analyzing texts as instantiations of the system and as 
realizations of the three types of meaning potential in the semantics, and for 
relating texts to situations through the field, tenor and mode of the context. So 
1'11 be asking the theoretical linguists to reconsider their theory. 1'11 be 
suggesting that 'logic', like 'function', is something that must be a part of the 
whole semantics, relating to the whole context of situation, and not specifically 
to any one area of the semantics and one corresponding area of the context. 
In Systemic theory, the metafunctions- ideational, interpersonal and textual, 
corresponding to field, tenor and mode respectively in the context of situation -
cover the range of meaning potential of human beings and of their languages, so 
that the whole lexicogrammatical system of a language can be seen as a 
realization of these three universal semantic areas (e.g. Halliday 1978: 33, 142-
5, Halliday 1979, Halliday, Hasan 1976:22-23, Halliday 1985a: xxxiv, Halliday, 
Hasan 1989: 12). 
If we consider the reasons normally given for considering one metafunction 
or another as the one from which a particular part of the lexicogrammatical 
system derives, we can see that on each account the logical function is somehow 
different and set aside from the others: 
l) The clear relationship of the linguistic phenomenon to a particular part of 
the context of situation. The logical area of the semantics has no exclusive 
corresponding part of its own in the context. 
2) The phenomenon functions according to the mode described for one or the 
other of the metafunctions: "representing" for ideational (the observer function), 
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(the relevance function) (Halliday 1974: 95). In what follows we will see how 
unsatisfactory i t is to consider logical simply as a representing function, because 
it is also constituting and enabling. 
3) The phenomenon fits into the 'non-arbitrary' structural pattern 
corresponding to the metafunction - "particle" (constituents) for experiential, 
"field" (prosody) for interpersonal and "wave" (periodicity) for textual. Logical is 
simply described as 'recursive' (Halliday 1979: 74). 
Typical sites of the encoding of experiential meaning are the clause 
(transitivity), the group (e.g., the constituent structure of the noun phrase), and 
the lexicon (Halliday 1979: 63-66). Interpersonal meaning "is strung throughout 
the clause as a continuous motif or colouring" (Halliday 1979: 66). Textual 
meaning is encoded most typically as the theme and rheme (clause level), given 
and new (tone unit), and as elements of grammatica! and lexical cohesion, ali of 
which receive their justification from outside the sentence and extend their 
effects beyond the sentence to the level of te x t (Halliday 1979: 67-70, Halliday, 
Hasan 1976). But "logical structures present themselves in the semantic system 
as independent of any particular class or classes of phenomena" and "are not the 
source ofrules about what goes where" (Halliday 1979: 73-4). 
Halliday (1977: 176, 178-9) divides the ideational metafunction into two 
parts, experiential and logical, both of which he relates to field. He justifies 
linking experiential and logical together in this way on the grounds that "there 
is greater systemic interdependence between these two than between other 
pairs"(Halliday 1978: 131). 
Even someone as close to Halliday as is Hasan takes a different stand on this 
matter. Hasan (1978: 243) speaks of four metafunctions (she says 'macro-
functions'), experiential, interpersonal, textual and logical, with the last two 
relating to mode. It seems to me that Hasan has related her logical component to 
mode so that, taken together with the textual component, it could cover the two 
aspects of "textual unity": texture and structure. Texture is the type of textual 
unity created through cohesion (Halliday, Hasan 1976: 2). The structure of a text 
(a matter for which Hasan has shown more specific research interest than 
Halliday has) is the result of the linking together into an organized and unified 
whole (a text structure or generic structure) of the various functionally defined 
parts of a text: e.g., in an application for a medicai appointment: identification, 
application, offer, confirmation (see Hasan 1978: 233). In considering text 
structure a realization of the part of the semantics related to mode, Hasan is, 
rightly I think, bringing discourse matters into the system (lexicogrammatical 
in a broader sense, which includes discourse matters?) described as a realization 
of the semantics. Tbis solution fits my purposes very well, but I bave not yet 
seen a discussion of the implications for other areas of the description. 
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'Identification', 'application', 'offer' and 'confirmation' are, of course, 
functions. As far as the concept 'function' is concerned, it is not hard to argue 
that this must be included at ali levels. This is true in various of the many 
senses of 'function' (cf. Nichols 1984: 98-100). We of course bave functions at 
ali levels of the system in the 'grammatical' sense in which 'Agent' 
(experiential), 'Subject' (interpersonal) and 'Theme' (textual) are ali functions, 
and also at ali levels of the semantics in the metalanguage sense in which the 
three areas of the semantics are ali metafunctions. But it also seems obvious 
that if 'purposive activity' is, as Halliday and Hasan (1976: 22) say, a part of the 
field, then there must be a corresponding functional component in the ideational 
part of the semantics, which will bave manifestations in the system which can 
be interpreted on the basis of the functions they carry out in the discourse. 
Purposive activity also comes into the tenor (see, e.g., Smith 1985: 242) and 
corresponding interpersonal metafunction in the form of speech acts and the 
mood choices (Halliday 1971: 335), and into the mode and corresponding textual 
metafunction in the form of the 'discourse functions' that make up the genre. 
The negotiation in communication of 'purposes' and 'effects' regards ali three 
metafunctions, and the whole context of situation (see Bailey 1985). In the 
course of this study more will be said about the 'multifunctionality' of 
'functions'. In the work of at least two leading Systemic linguists, Gregory and 
Martin, multifunctional solutions bave been proposed.l 
My argument is that the same sort of multifunctionality applies to the 
'logic' in the semantics. This logic can, and must, I believe, be seen in different 
ways. I t can be seen dynamically as 'relating' and synoptically as 'relationships'. 
It can also be seen as 'external', the logic existing in reality (easily represented 
synoptically) and as 'internai', the logic human beings apply in the processes of 
relating aspects of reality (best represented dynamically). The external, synoptic 
use would seem to fit into the 'representing' function of the ideational area of 
semantics. The internai, dynamic use seems to be a part of the 'constituting' 
function of the interpersonal area. And both contribute to the 'enabling' function 
l Gregory (1967:184 ff.) had postulated a functional tenor (speech acts) 
alongside the personal tenor (formality etc.), a division which Halliday (1985b: 9) 
accepted, but then Gregory (1988:314-5) decided to get rid of functional tenor on the 
grounds that "there is no piace for a functional tenor, with multi-functional 
realization". He had, in fact, (Gregory 1982:71) schematized 'functional' in the 
semiotic stratum, and as a realization in the semantic stratum, but with the 'typical 
realization' in the lexicogrammatical stratum listed as 'various', and, as for the 
'function' it is 'normally associated with', the scheme gives us 'multi-functional'. 
Interestingly, Gregory (both in 1982:71 and in 1988:313) leaves 'logical' out of his 
scheme for functions. Martin (1980-81:esp. 25) places functional tenor in a deeper 
'stratum' underlying field, personal tenor and mode. 
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of the textual area (see, e.g. Halliday and Hasan 1976: 239-244 on internai and 
extemal conjunctives). 
If this idea is accepted, then we need to find a way of fitting it into our 
description. Perhaps what we need is a logical-functional component which, 
behind, around, or perpendicular to the levels of the experiential, interpersonal 
and textual metafunctions, can act on ali three levels. Fig. l is a possible 
graphic representation of this. In favour of this view, I think it can be shown l) 
that the parts of the grammar that are normally related to the logica! 
metafunction ali have important links to the interpersonal and textual 
metafunctions as well as the ideational, and 2) that some parts of the grammar 
not normally related to the logica! metafunction could, if i t were redefined as is 
proposed here, as a multifunctional, logical-functional component, find a 
collocation there which is in some ways more satisfactory than the one now 
granted them. 
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To begin with, some questions arise in relation to Hasan's use of the logica! 
function. What difference is there between Hasan's textual functions, and the 
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relationships between them, and interpersonal speech acts (see e.g. Halliday 
1971: 335), and the fit between these (Sinclair, Coulthard 1975: 130-5, Ventola 
1983: 242-3)? It seems to me that if there is a difference it is actually in the 
analysis rather than in the substance: the question would seem to be just 
whether the analysis is of the text seen as a completed product (related to mode) 
or as an ongoing process (related to tenor) - the question of synoptic vs dynamic 
models.2 
Halliday, as we know, relates different sets of options in the lexicogrammar 
to each of the metafunctions. The logical metafunction is presented by Halliday 
(1985a: 193 ff.) as relating to hypotaxis and parataxis, and to expansion (by 
enhancement, elaboration, or extension) and projection. It is seen, along with 
the experiential metafunction, as our way of 'representing' what is 'out there' in 
reality (Halliday 1975: 40). But if we see the speaker not just as an observer, 
but more actively involved in shaping his own picture of reality, then we see 
him, even in this metafunction, as carrying out functions like 'compare', 
'contrast', 'sequence' 'explain' (while creating enhancements) and 'add' (while 
creating extensions), and therefore not just 'representing', but 'constituting' 
reality, as he does in the interpersonal metafunction, in the part of this which 
regards discourse functions or speech acts. 
So what we have here is a component - what I am calling the 'logical-
functional' component - which, rather than fitting nicely into any one slot in 
our system, seems to be present at alllevels: in relation to field, where it gives 
us the relationships realized hypotactically and paratactically as elaborations, 
enhancements and extensions, in relation to tenor, where it gives us speech acts 
which are pertinent to the interaction, and in relation to mode, where it gives us 
text cohesion through conjunctives (Martin 1983) and text structure through 
functional fit in a configuration corresponding to a genre. 
But once we agree to reconsider the theory in this way, other problems come 
to our attention. We are led on to take another look at the process types which 
Halliday relates (as transitivity) to the experiential component of the ideational 
metafunction. According to Halliday's (1979: 64-5) conception of non-arbitrary 
structure types corresponding to the metafunctions, the analysis at the 
experientiallevel should be an analysis of "discrete elements" or components, 
"each of which makes its own distinctive contribution to the whole" since 
2 Halliday (1985b:10) wrote: "The major problem perhaps is that of interpreting 
the text as process, and the system as evolution (its ontogenesis in the language 
development of children): in other words, of representing both the system and its 
instantiation in dynamic as well as in synoptic terms. Dynamic models of semiotic 
systems are not yet very well developed, and this is one of the problems that 
theorists of language now have to solve." Among the Systemic linguists now 
working on dynamic models are Martin (1985), Sinclair (1985) and Bateman (1989). 
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"experiential meanings are realized through some kind of constituent structure". 
Whereas material, mental, verbal and behavioural processes give us 
'constituents' in a 'representation' of reality, 'relational' and the closely related 
'existential' processes do not. This point has been made in a recent artide by 
McGregor (1990: 23-24). Relational processes are of two types: identifying and 
attributing. Now, seen in the perspective we are adopting here, 'identify' and 
'attribute' are also logical-functional. Through the functions 'identify' and 
'attribute', we set up a logical relationship of identity or identification and of 
attribution. In this light, rather than realizations of the experiential 
metafunction, attribution and identification would seem to be realizations of our 
logical-functional component. This view helps us to overcome the problems 
that come up when we turn to the 'componential', experiential analysis, in terms 
of transitivity, of certain types of sentences we fin d in texts. Here are two 
examples from texts I have been working on with my students: 
"Half in fear and half because of the blast, Marcovaldo leaped up and 
fell back, stunned." (from the translation by W. Weaver of Calvino's 
Marcovaldo, London, Picador, 1985, p. 99) 
"He returned home tired and discouraged" (from The One Minute 
Manager, by Kenneth Blanchard and Spencer Johnson, William 
Morrow & Co., New York, 1981, p. 15). 
The problem is how to combine the attribution with the material process. The 
analysis becomes easier if we accept a logical relationship of attribution as 
outside of the experiential structure as such, although relating notions which are 
experiential ('stunned', 'tired', 'discouraged') to the components of this structure.3 
The existence of languages with no relational verbs provides support for this 
view. Consider the difficulty of analyzing the following sentence: 
"It hung, blue and inviting, between two buildings located somewhere 
near 91st Street and Centrai Park West, a narrow, distant gap in the 
brick and concrete thicket outside my window." (from an article in the 
lnternational Herald Tribune, August 4, 1986, p. 5, "It Was Just a 
Piece of Sky, But It Redeemed the View" by Val L. Ellicott) 
3 This has been pointed out by McGregor (1990:24), who also thinks that 
circumstances should be related to the logica! function rather than to the experiential 
(1990:26-28), and projection to the interpersonal rather than to the logica! 
(1990:376-42), and that existential there clauses (and similarly it-clefts) are better 
seen in relation to the textual metafunction (cataphoric indexing to what is presented 
after the relational verb) than as a process type in the experiential metafunction 
(1990:21,32). 
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It (i.e., the piece of sky visible from the window) is at once Actor in the 
material process expressed in the verb hung, the Carrier of the Attributes blue 
and inviting and a narrow, distant gap in the brick and concrete thicket outside 
my window, but the only process expressed is the material one. Again, an 
analysis where the attribution is not expected to fit into the string of 
components related to the process of the clause would be of help here. The 
problem does not regard only the transitivity-type analysis. Even for a syntactic 
analysis using the seven structure types (SV, SVO, SVC, SV A, SVOO, 
SVOC, SVOA - Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, Svartvik 1985:53) these fonns 
create problems. A solution I have, out of want of a better one, opted for with 
my students, that of considering these elliptical relative clauses, does not, in 
truth, satisfy me, since these attributes are hard to consider as postmodifications 
of the noun in each of these cases, and even harder in the equally possible case 
of: "Tired and discouraged, he retumed home." 
Similar problems arise for presentative fonns (cf. Lakoff 1987: 462 ff.) in 
existential clauses, where the only experiential component in the strictest sense 
is what is presented. Let's again consider a sentence that carne up for analysis 
during my course: 
"There's people living all along the road" 
(from Pinter, The Caretaker Act I). 
Halliday (1985a: 130) classifies the relative-like clauses in existential sentences 
as hypotactic. It is, indeed, a problem to consider these as embedded post-
modifications of the noun that precedes them, since they seem to relate rather to 
the whole clause that precedes them. But also as hypotaxis they are particular, 
since they have none of the intonational signs of division nonnal for hypotaxis, 
and basically, the two parts do not seem divisible at ali. l'd like to suggest that 
we might need to consider the function 'presentation' as part of our logical-
functional component, acting, in the case of our example, upon a clause with a 
material process (live). The need for this type of analysis can be underscored by 
considering two more possible sentences related to the one from the Herald 
Tribune: "Between two buildings, there hong a piece of sky." "On each side of 
the piece of sky, there rose dark towering buildings." In the analysis I am 
proposing, in both sentences the hypothesized logical-functional component 
would come in as the presentation function. It would also come in for the 
expansion of location that relates the entity of 'piace' to the participant and 
process constituents. But we willlook at this in a moment. 
I believe that if we solve the problem of existentials, we can also solve the 
problem of predicated-theme structures, or clefts, which seems to be related. 
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Another example from the materials I have been using with my students will 
illustrate this: 
"It was McGuire put me on to them" 
(from O'Neill, Long Day's Journey into Night, Act 1). 
W e have precisely the same sort of question about how to analyze the relative-
like clause here as we had in the existential sentence. It might be necessary here 
to think in terms of a logical-functional element of identification acting on our 
material process clause in a way which involves no real instance of hypotaxis or 
of embedding. 
Whether what we do in relation to elements of reality is 'identify' or 
'present', the function is also textual: both the presentative form and the cleft are 
indexical to the situation, one to introduce a topic into it, the other to index one 
element to the exclusion of ali others in the situation as the one that is relevant 
to the discourse at hand. 
The logical-functional component we are postulating would give us 
relationships like 'cause', 'condition', 'time', 'piace', 'comparison' which are at 
the basis (in expansion) of enhancement, as weli as 'addition', which is at the 
basis of extension. It would also give us 'identification' and 'attribution'. Not 
only are these two elements the ones that constitute the so-calied 'relational 
processes', but identification is also at the basis of 'elaboration' (the third type of 
expansion - the type realized by the non-defining relative and the appositive 
clause). 
Circumstances (tipically, the adverbial elements in the transitivity analysis 
of the clause) also have the same logical relationships (e.g., 'time', 'piace', 
'cause') to the other components of the clause as do clauses to each other in 
hypotaxis, and sentences to each other in text conjunction. It seems to me that 
this existence at ali ranks of the grammar can be taken as another sign that the 
logical component, just like 'function', is present throughout the semantics. The 
sentence we have just analyzed from the Herald Tribune might have had, instead 
ofthe spatial circumstance between two buildings located somewhere near 91st 
Street and Centrai Park West, a hypotactic spatial enhancement like: "It hung 
where two buildings stood side by side somewhere near 91 st Street and Centrai 
Park West." Furthermore, these 'enhancements' at clause level, clause-complex 
level and textual level can, in many cases, be either more 'pragmatic', 
'disjunctive' and 'internai' (and therefore more interpersonal) or else more 
'semantic', 'adjunctive' and 'extemal' (and therefore more experiential) (cf. 
Halliday, Hasan 1976: 240, van Dijk 1977: 209 ff., Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech 
Svartvik 1985: 612-31, 1070-74). So I would like to bring circumstances, 
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expansion and conjunction back together in the description, through the logical-
functional component. 
There are also enhancements within the verb phrase - those process-
modulating enhancements 4 of time (begin by ... , tend to ... ), manner (hasten 
to ...• hesitate to ... ),cause (happen to ...• remember to) and accompaniment 
(help to ... ) that, in the transitivity analysis, must not be treated as separate 
processes (Halliday 1985: 259-60). These too can be seen as a manifestation of 
the logical-functional component. 
A grammatica} manifestation of time relations in the semantics is tense. 
Tense figures in Halliday's work as a realization of the ideational metafunction, 
relating either to the experiential function (Halliday 1977: 180), or partly to the 
experiential and partly to the logical function (Halliday 1979: 66), or else 
completely to the logical function (Halliday 1985a: 176).5 It seems to me, 
however, that tense actually operates multifunctionally: it is deictic to the 
discourse time and is so closely related to mood that i t is part of the fmite of the 
clause, so it would seem to be interpersonal; it plays an important role in text 
cohesion and in foregrounding and backgrounding, especially in its aspectual 
element 6 (see, e.g. Hopper 1979, Delancey 1982: 179), so it is also textual. 
Tense is ideational in that it is related to the entity, time and to the temporal 
organization of events. An attempt to use the Systemic metafunctions as a basis 
for the presentation of grammar in language teaching would certainly entail 
making a decision about what to do about something as basic as tense, and I 
have begun evaluating the advantages that could come from considering it a 
realization of the logical-functional element we are postulating. 
Time phase elements in the verb phrase (e.g., startlstop doing, keep 
doing ), which the transitivity analysis does not treat as separate processes 
(Halliday 1985: 256-7), must also, I believe, be seen as manifestations of our 
logical-functional component. 
4 Halliday's use of the term 'modulation' for these process enhancements seems 
unfortunate to me, since it creates confusion wilh his more well-known use of the 
same term for pseudo-~odality. 
5 See Ellis (1987:111 -2) for the argument in favour of considering tense 
completely as a manifestation of the logical function. Halliday (1979:77), referring 
to characteristics such as recursiveness and being "rank-free" which are typical of 
logical structures, singles out tense and report as "nearer the borderline". He says 
they are "only just logical structures". or tense, he says that it "is particularly 
interesting because it has only come into the category of logical structures within 
the last two to three centuries, and English appears to be unique in treating tense in 
this way." 
6 Halliday (1985a: 180-181) treats aspect in the finite verbal group as a part of 
tense (present in present, past in present etc.). 
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Projection (or report), both mental and verbal, is related to the logical 
component of the ideational metafunction in Halliday's work. Of course we 
know that the ideational metafunction is the one in which language reflects, 
represents reality, and in which the speaker's role is that of observer of reality 
(Halliday 1979:60). However, projection is not simply a way in which parts of 
reality 'out there' are related. Like modality, it is a way of limiting the 
commitment of the speaker to the message, and in this sense is interpersonal. 
Its scope can be limited to any level - even to the object of a preposition as in 
the headline of an artide which we analyzed in class: 
"Benefits Threat Over Too Many Rooms'" 
(from The Guardian, March 6, 1989). 
In this case it is very important to realize that 'too many rooms' is a projection, 
so as to realize that the evaluation expressed in too many is not to be interpreted 
as the joumalist's. Projection can be subtly insinuated, with its effects on the 
grammar of shared and unshared knowledge (Taylor Torsello 1987: 24-28, 45-
49), into a prepositional phrase: 
"White House aides are losing patience with what they see as the 
heavy-handed tactics of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt ... " (Newsweek, Aprii 
22, 1985, p. 9) 
Here the definite article is justified on the basis of the shared knowledge 
attributed to the White house aides, whereas the writer can avoid committing 
himself on the matter. To see this we can compare the following form, without 
projection, where the joumalist does commit himself: "White House Aides are 
losing patience with the heavy-handed tactics of Rep. Guy V an der J agt". Al so 
compare a version where commitment and definite reference are both avoided: 
"Rep. Guy Vander Jagt is accused of using heavy-handed tactics." There can be 
lexical and intonational signs of projection, without any projecting clause. 
Bolinger (1979: 307-8) gives us an example of this: "His wife knows perfectly 
well that Tom is a jerk", where knows perfectly we/1 and a rising tone on Tom 
is a jerk are sure signs that the speaker, at the same time that he is presenting 
Tom is a jerk as Tom's wife's mental projection, is also presenting it as a 
previous verbal projection of his own. In Italian we can even use the conditional 
to indicate that we are projecting the opinion of others: 
"Craxi al Quirinale. Dopo mesi di dubbi, l'idea starebbe conquistando 
il leader socialista .... " (la Repubblica, Oct. 2, 1991, p. 1). 
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Projection often extends its scope beyond sentence level, as in the following 
sequence: 
''That's unbelievable," said the young man. "Does he bave the best 
equipment?" (from The OM Minute Manager, p. 48) 
It often occurs without a projecting clause (Young 1988: 33-34). It can even be 
expressed from a receptive point of view: 
"As the man sat and listened to the 'nice' people answer the same 
question, he heard, 'l'm a democratic manager."' (The One Minute 
Manager, p. 14). 
Furthennore, through the choice of different projecting verbs (began, continued, 
conc/uded), projection can be used to frame episodes in narrative.7 These 
considerations lead us to see projection as operating within the textual 
metafunction as well. 
It seems to me that the approach to the logical component as 
multifunctional might also make some other aspects of the grammar which have 
created problems in application more manageable. 
I have some thoughts about how this approach might relate to some 
problems which arise in the areas of modulation (considered experiential -
Halliday 1977: 180) and modality (interpersonal), and of comparison (considered 
logical) and intensification (considered interpersonal). There are practical 
problems related to treating these areas as separate parts of the grammar, 
realizing different fundamental semantic functions. 
The close relationship between modulation and modality makes it hard, and 
impractical, to treat these as completely separate parts of the grammar. In the 
system many of the realizations are the same (e.g. must, may, wi/1). 
Modulation has uses which are clearly interpersonal, such as its perfonnative 
uses (Huddleston 1984: 358), and its various uses for purposes of speaker 
contro l. 
Similar difficulty arises from having to treat comparison and intensification 
as separate in the system, comparison being considered ideational and, 
specifically, logical, and intensification being classed as interpersonal. The 
problem is that in the area where distinguishing between comparison and 
intensification is most difficult Systemic grammar usually makes use of fonnal 
7Nichols (1984: 109) says that Michael Silverstein in a 1984 article on Chinook 
shows how in this language verbs for speech acts are used regularly to frame episodes 
in narrative, with one verb used to report speech events that continue speech 
interaction and another used to report speech events that bound or cut off such 
interaction. 
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criteria: the possibility of predetenniner adjective position (too serious a matter) 
and of post-adjectival completion by an embedded result clause (too serious to be 
any fun) (Veltman 1985: 192-3). The conclusion is that too is comparative, and 
therefore ideational. Now any of us who work with our students on a headline 
like "BENEFITS THREAT OVER 'TOO MANY ROOMS"' know that there is 
an aspect of personal evaluation involved in the judgment of the rooms' being 
'too many' which is crucial to the understanding of the text, so too has an 
undeniable interpersonal function bere. 
Perhaps in relation to these problems too, postulating a logical-functional 
component which is not restricted to any metafunction can help us. 
Modulation (inclination, obligation) can be seen as an aspect of cause, and 
cause is easy to consider as part of our logical-functional component When the 
modulating type of causai function operates on the experiential component, we 
get the more 'representing' types of modulated expressions: "W e were obliged to 
take a detour because the main road was flooded." When the modulating type of 
causai function operates on the interpersonal component it enters into the active 
creation of role-relationships and speech functions: "You must help me now, 
John." 
lf we can also relate conation (try to .... manage to ... ) to cause, and in this 
way to our logical-functional component, then we will bave accounted for 
another of the parts of the verb phrase which in a transitivity analysis must not 
be treated as separate processes. 
Causative verbs (make do, let do), another group of those which are not 
treated as separate processes in the transitivity analysis when they occur along 
with another verb, can also be related to the cause element of the logical-
functional component 
I t may be that even modality should be seen as the result in the interpersonal 
area of the workings of an aspect of the logical-functional component which is 
polarity. Ellis (1987: 109) points out that Halliday has, at different times, 
related polarity to each of the three metafunctions, and Ellis himself argues for 
considering it as logica!. Polarity, as experiential, represents the being and not 
being, the doing and not doing, aspects of reality. When polarity becomes 
interpersonal, it is a close-knit part of the finite involved in mood-fonning 
options, and also gives us the possibility of 'constituting' degrees of meaning 
between yes and no: "It might rain"; "You must be tired". Textually, polarity 
'enables' a w ho le piece of discourse to affinn or deny, accept or re fuse, prescribe 
or prohibit. 
Just as we were able to account for time phase as part of the time element of 
our logical-functional component, I believe we can account for reality phase 
(seem to .... turn out to ... ) by relating it through modality to polarity, and 
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thereby to the logical-functional component. Halliday (1985: 257) in fact says 
that "the two categories of phase are related to modality and tense ... " 
Now let's consider the results of postulating comparison, too, as part of a 
logical-functional component coming in at ali levels. In the experiential 
function, the speaker-observer would be seen as representing reality and the 
comparative-type relations (e.g., similarities, differences) which he sees between 
parts of it In the interpersonal function, the speaker actively constitutes reality 
through the speech functions of comparing and contrasting. He also expresses 
his own evaluations by comparing things not only to each other, but also to his 
own personal, or culturally received, norm. It is this that he is doing when, for 
example, he says someone is "very old" (usually considered intensification) and 
also "too old to team to dance the lambada" (usually considered comparison), or, 
going back to our headline, when he says that four rooms are "too many rooms" 
for a family of four claiming housing benefits. In the textual function, 
relationships of comparison can be realized by conjunctions (e.g.,likewise). 
Even the adversatives would seem to realize logical-functional comparison. 
As a final thought, I would like to suggest that 'refer' and 'assert' are 
functions just like 'identify', 'attribute', 'present', 'project', and 'relate' are, and 
that the systematic setting up of relationships between what is referred to (as 
shared information) and what is asserted (as unshared information) is an 
extremely important part of language activity. This could also be seen as an 
aspect of comparison - contrasting parts of reality for our interactive purposes. 
Halliday (1984: 28-29) says that at 22 months Nigel had created a systematic 
category for differentiating between shared and unshared experience, which he 
later on lost, and which is not present in adults. In adult use, this is a matter of 
"packaging information" so as to take into account the hearer's needs, and 
involves matters of presupposition. It is not simply a matter of information 
units, or of corresponding tone units and prominence points. These are only 
elements in a much more complex set of phenomena which goes from the 
definite/indefinite distinction, to final vs non-final position in clause complexes 
and in ditransitive structures, to such prosodic options as falling vs. rising tone 
(see Brazil 1975, 1978, 1985), position of tonic syllable, number of feet, 
number of tone units, and many other phenomena, which relate to ali ranks of 
grammar and to ali parts of the semantics and of the context of situation (see 
Taylor Torsello 1987). Halliday relates information structure to the textual 
metafunction. McGregQr (1990: 44-4) insists on the interpersonal nature of 
information packaging and of the presuppositions which this entails. I am 
suggesting that a logical-functional basis for the relationship between what is 
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referred to as shared and what is asserted as unshared might mak:e this seemingly 
unsystematic part of the system easier to describe. 8 
Several considerations contribute to giving me the courage to postulate a 
new, multifunctional solution for the logical function: 
l) The fact that Hasan has already opened the way to tak:ing i t out of the 
ideational metafunction, by herself mak:ing it a separate function, related to 
mode rather than to field. 
2) The fact that 'function' itself has already been postulated as 
multifunctional. 
3) The fact that, on the whole, it seems to me that this adjustment would 
mak:e the description more usable for what I need to do with it, which is helping 
students to learn the English language and how it works. 
In this approach, I am comforted by recalling that Michael Halliday (1974: 
97), in his interview with Parrett, as he discussed his own stand on how the 
metafunctions should be posited (specifically, he was insisting on equal status 
for the ideational and the interpersonal metafunctions), was careful to add 
"though always pointing out that it is simply for the purposes of the kinds of 
investigation I personally am interested in". So now, I want to turo back to the 
theoretical linguists and, pointing to the sorts of practical problet\ts I have 
brought out in this paper, ask Halliday's own question: "What should we mak:e 
language look like in order to throw light on questions of this kind?" l'Il be 
anxiously awaiting the solutions they might propose. l'm also curious to know 
whether or not ,they will be interested in tak:ing up the suggestion I have made 
here and following it through to see what sort of description i t actually leads to. 
8 A similar distinction in language use is made between what is treated as fact and 
what is treated as hypothesis, and in this case too there are consequences on the 
various parts of the system and at ali ranks of the grammar. The fact/hypothesis 
distinction might also need to be related to the logical-functional component. I can 
think of three ways in which the link might be posited: l) the distinction might be 
considered a development of polarity (with fact at the two poles and hypothesis in 
between); 2) the function ''hypothesize" might alternate and contrast with functions 
like "assert''; 3) the distinction might be seen as a development of comparison -
contrasting two modes of formulating reality. This note is clearly a particularly 
tentative part of this paper. 
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